We have confined ourselves to those large problems that more or less constantly engaged the attention of the high command: transportation across oceans and continentsdivision of effort and resources in a coalition of sovereign, unequally endowed nations, different in their interests and outlook co-ordination of logistical support of "joint" operations employing land, sea, and air power in varying admixturesdevelopment of effective planning techniques for anticipating needs in men and matriel long before they emerged organizational and administrative difficulties attendant upon mobilization and an unprecedented expansion of the nation's military powerthe delicate relationships between strategy and logistics, especially in the formulation of strategic plansthe frictions of interagency co-ordination, both within the Military Establishment and between it and the civilian authorities.
The most persistent theme is the chronic, pervasive competition for resourcesa competition that was scarcely diminished even when the war machine began to pour out those resources with a prodigality the world had never before seen. This approach has its disadvantages. In looking out from the center at a distant horizon, so to speak, we may have missed some of the hard and humdrum reality of logistics, as many of our readers no doubt experienced it ix.
Of such realities a Yankee friend of ours, learning one day in that he was about to be transferred from this latter war front to a more active one overseas, scribbled a few exultant verses: Shake, shake, oh dust of Charlotte, from my feet! Leave off, oh rebel twangings, from my ears; Unpackage me, oh package factory, That from your ancient war that never ends I may go on to this one that today I s real. This reaction was understandable. The "package factory" in North Carolina was unexciting enough, Heaven knows, yet it was indispensable to the "real" war that our friend yearned to see.
It was, in fact, one of the realities of the Army's logistical experience that, regrettably, does not figure largely in this book. In so broad an approach, moreover, certain topical omissions have been unavoidable in the effort to achieve, within the space at our disposal, a reasonable depth of treatment. We have made no attempt to cover the entire potpourri of activities that official usage in recent years has labeled as "logistics.
We have left to the historians of the Army Air Forces, moreover, the task of treating the logistics of air power. What remains, in general, is a central view of the logistics of ground warfare, heavily accenting supply and transportation, and bounded in space on one side by the factory and depot in the United States, on the other by the overseas port or beachhead. Chronologically, the book covers the prewar mobilization period and the first year and a half of American participation in the war, stopping on the eve of the Washington conference of May A second volume, now in preparation, will carry the story through to the end of the war.
This is a work of collaboration. Very few chapters are solely the product of one author's labors. With little visible strain upon good nature or friendship, we have freely exchanged criticism and suggestions, editing, substantive data, and even draft segments of chapters, though one or the other of us has undertaken the final writing of each chapter. The general scheme of the book is a joint product.
Over all, the division of labor has shaped up approximately as follows: Chapters and sections dealing with Anglo-American strategic planning, ship construction and munitions production, allocation of merchant shipping, landing craft, the Army's supply programs and its machinery for supply and transportation, the Pearl Harbor crisis, the logistical build-up in the British Isles and the North African operation are by LeightonIntroduction, and x.
Our large debt to others can only be sketchily described here. First and most grateful mention goes to Dr. Kent Roberts Greenfield, Chief Historian of the Army and conscientious literary godfather, who has patiently read and meticulously criticized the manuscript at each of its many stages, and through it all has never allowed us to forgethowever little our endeavors seemed to justify the hopethat a specialized subject can be made interesting to others besides specialists. Susan Frost Parrish not only did much of the basic research for the chapters on the Pacific war, but also made important monographic contributions to those chapters.
Similarly, parts of the chapters on the North African operation are based on material prepared in draft by Dr.
Mae Link. Charles Owens, coming late into this project, was yet able to do most of the work of compiling and drafting the charts and tables and to shepherd the manuscript through innumerable proofreadings. Easterling, for their indefatigable labor in what might be called the logistics of publishing this book, we are eternally grateful.
Our statistical data have undergone the vigilant scrutiny of Messrs. Theodore E. Whiting, George R. Powell, and Joseph A. Tackley; our maps were prepared by Mr.
Wsevolod Aglaimoff and his staff, with the exception of the three map-sketches on pages 47, 51, and , which were drawn by Miss Muriel Chamberlain of the Government Printing Office. Our massive index is the work of Dr. Rose C. Engelman, who we hope will never again have to undertake such a chore. The task of digging through mountains of administrative records would have been immeasurably more difficult without the cheerful assistance given by Mrs. Hazel E. The specific contributions of our colleagues in the Office of Military History, who have all had a direct or indirect influence on the book, have been shown in the footnotes and Bibliographical Note.
In particular, we owe much to Mr. Maurice Matloff's special competence in the field of strategic planning. Many others have given generously of their time in reading and criticizing large sections of the manuscript; we would like especially to thank Col. Vincent J. Esposito, Dr. Benjamin H. Williams, Col. George G. O'Connor, Capt. Tracy B. Orlando Ward Ret , Dr. John D. Millett, Dr. John Bowditch, Dr.
Stetson Conn, Dr. Louis Morton, Lt. LeRoy Lutes Ret , Lt. Leo J. Meyer, Maj.
Nothing shall be omitted for the purpose of concealing or glossing over what might be regarded by some as a defect of policy. Edward R. Item specifics Condition: Like New: A book that looks new but has been read. As Wedemeyer makes clear, mobilization transcends purely military matters and must be understood to embrace the capacity of nations. Duncan Hall and C. Persian Corridor Supply Routes 8. Please enter 5 or 9 numbers for the ZIP Code.
William M. Goodman Ret , Brig.
Frank A. Bogart, Maj. Walter A. Wood, Jr. Ret , Maj. Richard C. Moore Ret , Maj.
Grow Ret , Maj. Carter B. Magruder, Brig. William E. Carraway, Col. George A.
Lincoln, and Maj. George H. Members of the Historical Section of the British Cabinet Office have also contributed helpful comments on portions of the manuscript. Changing Conceptions of Logistics. The Vagaries of Usage. The Army's Logistical Effort, The Peacetime Logistical Establishment. Anglo-American Co-ordination of Production Planning. Aid to Other Nations.
Britain's W a r. The Logistics of Hemisphere Defense. ABC-1 a n d Rainbow 5. Ships f o r Britain. State of Readiness: Mid T h e Administrative Problem. Early Operations Under Lend-Lease.
The Injection of Chinese Demands.